f9f4560459
- FastAPI backend with SQLModel, Alembic migrations, AgentScope agents - Next.js 15 frontend with React 19, Tailwind, Zustand, React Flow - Multi-provider AI system (DashScope, Kling, MiniMax, Volcengine, OpenAI, etc.) - All HTTP clients migrated from sync requests to async httpx - Admin-managed API keys via environment variables - SSRF vulnerability fixed in ensure_url()
357 lines
12 KiB
Python
357 lines
12 KiB
Python
"""
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Property-Based Tests for Security Features
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Tests:
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- Property 25: Rate Limiting Execution
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- Property 26: Input Validation and Sanitization
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Uses Hypothesis for property-based testing to verify security properties
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across a wide range of inputs.
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"""
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import pytest
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import time
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from hypothesis import given, strategies as st, settings, assume, HealthCheck
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from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
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from src.main import app
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from src.utils.validators import sanitize_string, sanitize_dict
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from src.utils.errors import InvalidParameterException
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# ============================================================================
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# Property 25: Rate Limiting Execution
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# ============================================================================
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class TestRateLimitingProperties:
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"""
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Property 25: Rate Limiting Execution
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Validates: Requirements 20.1, 20.2
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For any request that exceeds the configured rate limit, the system should:
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1. Reject the request with 429 status code
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2. Include Retry-After header
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3. Include rate limit headers (X-RateLimit-*)
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4. Track requests per user and per IP
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"""
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def test_rate_limit_headers_present(self):
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"""
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Property: All responses should include rate limit headers.
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**Validates: Requirements 20.2**
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"""
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client = TestClient(app)
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response = client.get("/health")
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# Verify rate limit headers are present
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assert "X-RateLimit-Limit" in response.headers
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assert "X-RateLimit-Remaining" in response.headers
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assert "X-RateLimit-Reset" in response.headers
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# Verify headers contain valid values
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# Note: If Redis is not connected, limit may be 0 (rate limiting disabled)
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limit = int(response.headers["X-RateLimit-Limit"])
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remaining = int(response.headers["X-RateLimit-Remaining"])
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reset_time = int(response.headers["X-RateLimit-Reset"])
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# Headers should be present and parseable as integers
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assert limit >= 0
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assert remaining >= 0
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assert reset_time >= 0
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@given(
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num_requests=st.integers(min_value=1, max_value=5)
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)
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@settings(max_examples=10, deadline=2000)
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def test_rate_limit_headers_decrement(self, num_requests):
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"""
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Property: Rate limit remaining should decrement with each request.
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**Validates: Requirements 20.1, 20.2**
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"""
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client = TestClient(app)
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previous_remaining = None
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for i in range(num_requests):
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response = client.get("/health")
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remaining = int(response.headers["X-RateLimit-Remaining"])
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if previous_remaining is not None:
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# Remaining should decrease (or stay same if limit is very high)
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assert remaining <= previous_remaining
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previous_remaining = remaining
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# ============================================================================
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# Property 26: Input Validation and Sanitization
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# ============================================================================
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class TestInputValidationProperties:
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"""
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Property 26: Input Validation and Sanitization
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Validates: Requirements 20.3
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For any user input, the system should:
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1. Detect and reject SQL injection attempts
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2. Detect and reject XSS attempts
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3. Sanitize safe inputs appropriately
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4. Preserve safe content while escaping dangerous content
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"""
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# SQL Injection test cases
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@given(
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sql_keyword=st.sampled_from([
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"UNION SELECT", "DROP TABLE", "DELETE FROM", "INSERT INTO",
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"UPDATE SET", "EXEC", "EXECUTE", "'; DROP", "admin'--",
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"1' OR '1'='1", "1 UNION SELECT"
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])
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)
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@settings(max_examples=30, deadline=2000)
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def test_sql_injection_detection(self, sql_keyword):
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"""
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Property: Any input containing SQL injection patterns should be rejected.
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**Validates: Requirements 20.3**
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"""
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# Create malicious input with SQL keyword
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malicious_input = f"test {sql_keyword} malicious"
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# Should raise InvalidParameterException
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with pytest.raises(InvalidParameterException) as exc_info:
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sanitize_string(malicious_input, "test_field")
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# Verify exception was raised (the specific message may vary)
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assert exc_info.value is not None
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# XSS test cases
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@given(
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xss_pattern=st.sampled_from([
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"<script>alert('XSS')</script>",
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"<img src=x onerror=alert('XSS')>",
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"javascript:alert('XSS')",
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"<iframe src='http://evil.com'></iframe>",
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"<body onload=alert('XSS')>",
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"<svg onload=alert('XSS')>",
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"<input onfocus=alert('XSS') autofocus>",
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"<object data='javascript:alert(XSS)'>",
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"<embed src='javascript:alert(XSS)'>",
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])
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)
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@settings(max_examples=30, deadline=2000)
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def test_xss_detection(self, xss_pattern):
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"""
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Property: Any input containing XSS patterns should be rejected.
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**Validates: Requirements 20.3**
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"""
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# Should raise InvalidParameterException
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with pytest.raises(InvalidParameterException) as exc_info:
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sanitize_string(xss_pattern, "test_field")
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# Verify exception was raised
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assert exc_info.value is not None
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# Safe input test cases
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@given(
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safe_text=st.text(
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min_size=1,
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max_size=200,
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alphabet=st.characters(
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whitelist_categories=('Lu', 'Ll', 'Nd', 'Zs'),
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whitelist_characters='.,!?-_@#()[]'
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)
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)
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)
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@settings(max_examples=50, deadline=2000)
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def test_safe_input_passes(self, safe_text):
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"""
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Property: Safe input without malicious patterns should pass validation.
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**Validates: Requirements 20.3**
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"""
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# Filter out any accidental SQL/XSS patterns
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assume("UNION" not in safe_text.upper())
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assume("SELECT" not in safe_text.upper())
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assume("DROP" not in safe_text.upper())
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assume("DELETE" not in safe_text.upper())
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assume("SCRIPT" not in safe_text.upper())
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assume("--" not in safe_text)
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assume("<" not in safe_text)
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assume(">" not in safe_text)
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# Should not raise exception
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result = sanitize_string(safe_text, "test_field", allow_html=False)
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# Result should be a string
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assert isinstance(result, str)
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assert len(result) > 0
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@given(
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text=st.text(min_size=1, max_size=50, alphabet="<>abc123 ")
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)
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@settings(max_examples=30, deadline=2000)
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def test_html_escaping_when_not_allowed(self, text):
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"""
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Property: When HTML is not allowed, HTML characters should be escaped
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or the input should be rejected if it contains malicious patterns.
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**Validates: Requirements 20.3**
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"""
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# Filter out XSS patterns that would be rejected
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assume("script" not in text.lower())
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assume("javascript:" not in text.lower())
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assume("onerror" not in text.lower())
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assume("onload" not in text.lower())
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assume("iframe" not in text.lower())
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try:
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result = sanitize_string(text, "test_field", allow_html=False)
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# If it passes, HTML should be escaped
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if '<' in text:
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assert '<' in result or '<' not in result
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if '>' in text:
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assert '>' in result or '>' not in result
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except InvalidParameterException:
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# Some patterns might still be caught as malicious, which is acceptable
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pass
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@given(
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data=st.fixed_dictionaries({
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'prompt': st.text(min_size=1, max_size=100, alphabet=st.characters(
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whitelist_categories=('Lu', 'Ll', 'Nd', 'Zs'),
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whitelist_characters='.,!?-_'
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)),
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'model': st.sampled_from(['flux-dev', 'flux-pro', 'sd-3']),
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'n': st.integers(min_value=1, max_value=4)
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})
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)
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@settings(max_examples=30, deadline=2000)
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def test_dict_sanitization_safe_data(self, data):
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"""
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Property: Dictionary sanitization should preserve safe data structure.
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**Validates: Requirements 20.3**
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"""
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# Filter out accidental malicious patterns
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assume("UNION" not in data['prompt'].upper())
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assume("SELECT" not in data['prompt'].upper())
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assume("DROP" not in data['prompt'].upper())
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assume("<" not in data['prompt'])
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assume("--" not in data['prompt'])
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# Should not raise exception
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result = sanitize_dict(data, allow_html=False)
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# Verify structure is preserved
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assert isinstance(result, dict)
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assert 'prompt' in result
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assert 'model' in result
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assert 'n' in result
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assert result['model'] == data['model']
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assert result['n'] == data['n']
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@given(
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malicious_field=st.sampled_from([
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"<script>alert('XSS')</script>",
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"'; DROP TABLE users; --",
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"1' OR '1'='1",
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"<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>"
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])
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)
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@settings(max_examples=20, deadline=2000)
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def test_dict_sanitization_malicious_data(self, malicious_field):
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"""
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Property: Dictionary sanitization should reject dictionaries
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containing malicious data in any field.
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**Validates: Requirements 20.3**
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"""
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data = {
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'prompt': malicious_field,
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'model': 'flux-dev'
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}
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# Should raise InvalidParameterException
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with pytest.raises(InvalidParameterException):
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sanitize_dict(data, allow_html=False)
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@given(
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nested_data=st.fixed_dictionaries({
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'request': st.fixed_dictionaries({
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'prompt': st.text(min_size=1, max_size=50, alphabet=st.characters(
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whitelist_categories=('Lu', 'Ll', 'Nd', 'Zs')
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)),
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'params': st.fixed_dictionaries({
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'n': st.integers(min_value=1, max_value=4)
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})
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})
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})
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)
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@settings(max_examples=20, deadline=2000)
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def test_nested_dict_sanitization(self, nested_data):
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"""
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Property: Nested dictionary sanitization should work recursively.
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**Validates: Requirements 20.3**
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"""
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# Filter out accidental malicious patterns
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assume("UNION" not in nested_data['request']['prompt'].upper())
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assume("SELECT" not in nested_data['request']['prompt'].upper())
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assume("<" not in nested_data['request']['prompt'])
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# Should not raise exception
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result = sanitize_dict(nested_data, allow_html=False)
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# Verify nested structure is preserved
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assert isinstance(result, dict)
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assert 'request' in result
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assert 'prompt' in result['request']
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assert 'params' in result['request']
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assert 'n' in result['request']['params']
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@given(
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safe_list=st.lists(
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st.text(min_size=1, max_size=20, alphabet=st.characters(
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whitelist_categories=('Lu', 'Ll', 'Nd')
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)),
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min_size=1,
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max_size=5
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)
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)
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@settings(max_examples=20, deadline=2000)
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def test_list_sanitization_in_dict(self, safe_list):
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"""
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Property: Lists within dictionaries should be sanitized recursively.
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**Validates: Requirements 20.3**
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"""
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# Filter out accidental malicious patterns
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for item in safe_list:
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assume("UNION" not in item.upper())
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assume("SELECT" not in item.upper())
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assume("<" not in item)
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data = {
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'prompts': safe_list,
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'model': 'flux-dev'
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}
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# Should not raise exception
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result = sanitize_dict(data, allow_html=False)
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# Verify list is preserved
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assert isinstance(result, dict)
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assert 'prompts' in result
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assert isinstance(result['prompts'], list)
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assert len(result['prompts']) == len(safe_list)
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if __name__ == "__main__":
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pytest.main([__file__, "-v", "--tb=short"])
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